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TECHNOLOGY FOUGHT THE LAW, AND THE LAW LOST 
BRYAN TISCIA 
Abstract 
This article examines why the Copyright Act treats physical copies of copyrighted work 
and digital media differently, while proposing solutions to reconcile the differences. During the 
past several decades technology has advanced at such a rapid pace, that the law has struggled to 
keep pace. These shortcomings are felt strongest where copyrights are applied to digital media. 
The recent decision in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., indicates that there is now 
absolutely no secondary market for digital media. This conclusion was never the intent of the 
Copyright Act. In fact, Congress clearly intended for the exhaustion of copyrights taking the 
form of digital media. However, given a world where piracy runs rampant, and exact replicas of 
copyrights can be created at the click of a button, should the Copyright Act allow for physical 
and digital copyrights to be treated the same?  
 This article will take a look at the history of the First Sale doctrine, the current landscape, 
and how to apply exhaustion principles to digital media.  Early case law demonstrates that 
Congress was concerned with the right of the people to control their physical possessions. Thus, 
rights were created for the consumer to modify, destroy, display, and sell their physical copies. 
However, after the introduction of digital media, the same property policies evaporated in favor 
of copyright holder rights. With the advent of End User License Agreements, it is rare that a 
person actually owns their digital content. Under the current Copyright Act, licensing gives too 
much power to the Copyright holder at the expense of giving no outlet to the public to alienate 
digital media. While licensing is important to copyright holders, to avoid pirating and 
unauthorized copying, there are better remedies available. This article will describe several 
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remedies to modernize the law, including the addition of all digital media into the copyright act, 
requiring uniform End User License Agreements, as well as allowing users to transfer their 
licenses as an alternative form of copyright exhaustion.   
Part I.  
In Capitol Records, LLC v.ReDigi Inc., the Southern District of New York held that the 
“first and only online marketplace for digital used music” infringed copyrights, reproduction, and 
distribution rights.
1
 This decision explicitly rejected the “first sale” defense, and put all 
Copyright creators, holders, and users on notice regarding the viability of any business model 
that seeks to create a second-hand market for digital media. 
ReDigi was significant because it directly implicated the future existence of any company 
that utilizes “cloud” based technology. ReDigi further represented a long string of cases, which 
have eviscerated all of the common law property rights associated with tangible copyrighted 
works. These rights include the right to repair, restore, modify and adapt. None of these rights, 
commonly enjoyed by the public for physical works, apply to digital media. This article explores 
the First Sale doctrine, and the policy reasons for its existence. It also discusses if those policy 
reasons still apply to digital media, and if they do not, should the doctrine itself not apply?  
This article approaches the problem with the understanding that the concerns of the 
copyright holder are strong. The digital version of copyrighted work can easily be pirated and 
copied without permission. However, the current licensing regime, created to protect those 
rights, is too strong at the expense of the publics right to access of copyrighted works. To 
establish this premise this article will proceed as follows: Part II. will discuss the origin of First 
                                                        
1
 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the defendant’s unauthorized transfer of digital music files 
over internet was reproduction within meaning of Copyright Act, and the first sale doctrine did not protect the 
defendant). 
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Sale, leading to its existence today. Additionally Part II. will detail the common law rights 
associated with property that existed long before the Frist Sale doctrine was created. These 
rights, which still exist today, include the right to repair, restore, modify, and adapt. Part III. Will 
discuss how the First Sale doctrine no longer applies to digital media. In doing this, Part III. will 
discuss how Congress first intended to deal with digital media, by examining how Congress 
extended the rights of property to digital media. Part III. will then discuss how each of the rights, 
specifically given to digital media, have been eradicated. Part IV. will examine the conflict 
between the copyright holders and the public. Part IV. will then offer three solutions, which 
balance the rights of the copyright holder with the public, including: introducing all digital media 
into the Copyright Act, as opposed to just computer programs; making EULA’s uniform; and 
allowing for the transfer of access to digital media, as opposed to ownership. Part V. concludes 
that the Copyright Act was intended to balance the rights of the copyright holder and the public, 
but that the current licensing regime favors copyright holders too favorably by eliminating 
alienation rights. However using the simple solutions proposed, several alienation rights can be 
restored to the public, while allowing the copyright holder the incentive needed to create digital 
media. 
Part II. The Origin of First Sale  
The purpose of Copyright is to motivate the creative activity of authors, while allowing 
the public access to their creative works.
2
 In order to incentivize the creation of creative works of 
expression, Congress bestows upon authors limited monopolies on their works.
3
 To allow the 
                                                        
2
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (discussing the intention of Copyright 
is to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired). 
3
 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.  § 106 (2002). 
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public access to these works, Congress put limitations on the rights of authors. 
4
 The First Sale 
doctrine is a limitation that exhausts one of the monopolies held by a Copyright holder. 
5
 
 The purpose of the First Sale doctrine is to end the copyright holders distribution right 
after a copyright holder sells a lawfully created copy of their work. The Copyright Act 
specifically states “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to … distribute 
copies … of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending.”6 However, § 109(a) prevents the previously mentioned actions from 
infringing copyright, because the owner of a lawfully purchased copy has the freedom to sell or 
otherwise dispose of that copy without permission from the author.
7
  
While the average person may have no idea what the First Sale doctrine is, most people 
rely on it every single day. When an individual lends a new book to a friend, the First Sale 
doctrine is involved. What a person sells used DVDs at a garage the First Sale doctrine protects 
them. Whenever a new video game is purchased as a gift for a relative, the first sale doctor pops 




 The First Sale doctrine was not always a part of the Copyright Act. In fact, the First Sale 
doctrine was not codified in the United States of America until 1909.
9
 In 1908 Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
v. Strauss was decided, and many scholars consider that to be the grandfather of the First Sale 
Doctrine.
10
 However, prior to the Supreme Court decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, many 
of the principals associated with the First Sale doctrine were still litigated under English 
                                                        
4
 17 U.S.C.  §§ 107-122. 
5






 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
9
 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 41 (1946) (amended 1947). 
10
 See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 889, 909 (2011) (discussing 
the genesis of the First Sale doctrine, and it’s direct link to Bobbs-Merrill). 
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Common Law. Part A. of this section will detail the history leading up to the First Sale doctrine, 
as it exists today, while Part B. will discuss the English Common Law property rights associated 
with the First Sale doctrine.  
A. First Sale doctrine as it exists today 
 The current First Sale doctrine can trace its roots to 1908, when a crafty publisher 
attempted to control the subsequent sales of copyrighted works by including a contract within the 
first pages of the book. The controversy in Bobbs-Merrill surrounded The Castaway, a novel, by 
Hallie Erminie Rives.
11
 The publisher of the book sought to fix the resale price of the book by 
attaching the following clause:  
The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is 
licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be 
treated as an infringement of the copyright.”12  
 
The defendants bought the entirety of their stock from wholesalers and retail outlets.
13
 The 
copies, bought from wholesalers, were purchased at a price of forty cents.
14
 The defendants, 
having full knowledge of the publisher’s restriction, sold their copies for 89 cents.15 The plaintiff 
sued for copyright infringement, and the case was litigated to the Supreme Court
16
 
The Supreme Court gave thorough consideration to the intent and meaning of the 
Copyright Act of 1831.
17
 The Court articulated how the primary focus of the copyright statute 
was to secure authors the right to multiply copies of their works.
18
 In order for that right to carry 
                                                        
11
 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908). 
12
 Id. at 341. 
13
 Id. at 341-42. The plaintiff bought 80% of it’s stock from wholesalers, and 20% from retailers. 
14
 Id. at 342. 
15




 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 342 (1908). 
18
 Id. at 347.  
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substance, authors needed the right to “vend.” 19  However, the Court held that this right 
exhausted upon the first sale of a particular copy.
20
  
The Supreme Court’s decision was based largely upon the statutory interpretation of the 
term “vend.” The Court asked whether one, who had the sole right to vend, was entitled to 
restrict the further sale of a book, by including a statement within its pages.
21
 It was clear to the 
Court that an author, who sells a copyrighted article, without restriction, loses the ability to 
further control, or restrict, sale.
22
 The Supreme Court determined that the defendant had bought 
the copies wholesale, and had not made any agreement that the books be sold at a dollar a copy.
23
 
This conclusion, that the right to vend is exhausted upon the first sale of a lawfully created copy, 
represented the birth of the First Sale doctrine.  
A year after the decision in Bobbs-Merrill the Copyright Act of 1909 was enacted, and 
included within was the First Sale doctrine. Section 41 of the Copyright Act, stated “nothing in 
this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted 
work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained.”24 That said, there is no doubt that the 
First Sale doctrine is tethered directly to the holding found within Bobbs-Merrill.  
To date, no holding or congressional mandate has fundamentally altered the core concept 
of the First Sale doctrine. Section 109(a), of the Copyright Act, is the current residence of the 
First Sale doctrine. Section 109(a) states:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular 
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
                                                        
19
 Id. at 351. 
20
 Id. at 350-351. 
21
 Id. at 351. 
22
 Id.  
23
 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908). 
24
 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §41 (1946) (amended 1947). 
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In other words, the holding within Bobbs-Merill is still controlling law. However, the rights of 
the owner do not end with the ability to determine price of the next sale. The owner of a lawfully 
created copy has property rights that developed out of the English Common.  
B. How the laws of Property informed the First Sale Doctrine 
 Bobbs-Merrill may represent the genesis of the First Sale doctrine as it exists today, but 
cases decided before 1908 demonstrate how property law forms the bedrock of the First Sale 
doctrine. English common law is embedded deep in all facets of the American legal system. 
Common Law influenced the First Sale doctrine through the theory of alienability of personal 
property.
26
 Our jurisprudence has avoided limitations, which restrict the use and resale of 
personal property, because they are “obnoxious to public policy.”27 This public policy is best 
served by having few restrictions for personal property that moves from hand to hand.
28
 
Copyright law shares this concept, however, the alienation of copyrighted works extends beyond 
mere hand-to-hand transactions, selling, trading, or gifting, and extends to the ability to repair 
and restore, as well as the ability to adapt and modify.  
1. The Right to Repair and Restore.  
Long before Bobbs-Merrill was decided, and as early as 1894, courts granted owners the 
right to enjoy their copies in the matter intended. These rights included the right to repair 
copyrighted works that had been damaged. In 1894 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                        
25
 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008). 
26
 See. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 981 (1928) (discussing how 
English Common Law has influenced intellectual Property in the context of unfair competition in Trademark). 
27
 See. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907). 
28
 Id.  
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rendered its decision in Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co.
29
 In Harrison, the plaintiff, a book 
publisher, had a policy of printing unbound sheets of books, and sending them to a 
bookbindery.
30
 The plaintiff had contracted with the bookbindery to store and bind copies of 
their books.
31
 While unbound copies of the plaintiff’s book were being stored at the bookbindery, 
a fire occurred.
32
 This fire damaged, or destroyed, all of the unbound pages stored within the 
warehouse.
33
 An employee of the plaintiff examined the bookbindery’s stock, and determined 
that the unbound pages could no longer be used to make books.
34
 As such, the plaintiff had the 
bookbindery sell the damaged stock as waste paper, with a provision that the stock be used as 
waste paper and nothing else.
35
 The defendant bought the damaged stock as waste paper, 
subsequently bound copies of the book together, and then sold them herself.
36
 The plaintiff 
brought suit, in equity, to end the alleged infringement of its copyright.
37
  
The plaintiff alleged a cause of action sounding entirely in Copyright law. The key 
distinction examined was the difference between the remedy of a copyright owner who had been 
defrauded in an unauthorized sale, and the remedy of a copyright owner who has given up 
control to a copy of his work subject to a contract.
38
 The Second Circuit held in favor of the 
defendant, and detailed how the right to restrain the sale of a copy evaporates when the seller 
parts with that copy.
39
 The Second Circuit’s conclusion fits in with the definition of the First Sale 
doctrine as created in Bobbs-Merrill, but it includes something more. Harrison also suggests that 
                                                        
29
 61 F. 689, 689 (2d Cir. 1894). 
30




 Id.  
33
 Id.  
34
 Id.  
35
 Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 689 (2d Cir. 1894). 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id. at 690. 
38
 Id. at 691.  
39
 Id. 
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there exists a right to repair defective or destroyed copyrighted works so that they can be enjoyed 
in the manner the copyrighted work was intended.  
This early vision of a right to repair would continue to be litigated in American 
jurisprudence, and would go as far as to allow the owner of a lawfully created copy the ability to 
replicate portions of copyrighted works in order to enjoy their copy. In Doan v. Am. Book Co., 
the Seventh Circuit Court elaborated on how exhaustion of the right to distribute also allowed for 
the replication of copyrighted works for the limited purpose of repair or renewal.
40
 The 
defendant was a publisher of various children’s schoolbooks.41 The plaintiff was a second hand 
retailer of books.
42
 The plaintiff lawfully obtained copies of the defendant’s books that required 
different levels of repair.
43
 Some copies had as little as soiled pages, others had pages, or 
sections of pages destroyed, as well as damaged covers.
44
 The plaintiff returned the damaged 
copies to a state where consumers could use them.
45
 
As already discussed in Harrison, the selling of books secondhand falls entirely within 
the purview of First Sale. However, there is something more than simply reselling the damaged 
books in Doan. While many of the “repairs” made by the plaintiff in no way implicated any of 
the reproduction rights, others appear to be bold-faced reproductions of copyrighted works.
46
 The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that within the rights transferred during the lawful sale of a 
copyrighted work is the “right of repair or renewal.”47 This right allowed the owner of the copy 
the ability to return the work to original condition, even if that meant reproducing part of the 
                                                        
40
 105 F. 772, 772 (7th Cir. 1901). 
41
 Id. at 776-77 
42
 Id. at 777 
43




 Id.  
46
 Doan v. Am. Book Co., 105 F. 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1901). 
47
 Id.  





 This case indicated that exhaustion covered more than the sale of lawfully produced 
copy, but also allowed the owner of a lawfully purchased copy the ability to utilize some of the 
rights allotted strictly to the holder of the copyright. 
The right to renew or repair is a limited right. When replication appears to be less for 
repair, and more for duplication, courts have found an infringement of copyright. In Ginn & Co 
v. Apollo Pub Co., the plaintiff was a publisher of schoolbooks.
49
 The defendant was in the 
business of rebinding old or secondhand books.
50
 After cleaning and rebinding the books the 
defendant would resells them secondhand.
51
 Some of the books had missing pages, and the 
defendant would replicate and replace them.
52
 These replacements were never intended to imitate 
the original; they were simply supplied so that the consumer would have a complete product.
53
 
The plaintiff brought suit on copyright grounds.
54
 
The issue before the court was how much of a copyrighted work may an owner replicate 
for the purposes of restoration, before the act itself is infringement.
55
 The court determined that, 
the owner could not reprint any material part of the copyrighted work.
56
 In coming to this 
conclusion, the court relied on the holdings in both Doan and Harrison. 
57
 The court balanced the 
language in Doan, that a man who is the “purchaser of a copyrighted book may resell it for what 
it is without any infringement of the copyright laws,”58 against the dictum in Harrison, “the new 
                                                        
48
 Id. at 778, The court analogizes the right to repair to the ability to “fix” a patented device that breaks, or 
malfunctions. 
49
 215 F. 772, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914). 
50
 Id.  
51
 Id.  
52
 Id. at 773, In some instances, the reproduction consisted of the original maps in geographies, which were part of 
the original publication, and other instances consisted of reprinted pages of text, which had been torn out, or were 
otherwise missing. 
53
 Id. at 775.  
54
 Id.  
55
 Ginn & Co v. Apollo Pub Co., 215 F. 772, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914). 
56
 Id. at 778-79. 
57
 Id. at 779. 
58
 Ginn, 215 F. 772 at 779. Citing, Doan, 105 F. 772 at 777. 
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purchaser cannot … print or publish a new edition of the book.”59 The court rendered the two 
cases to suggest that where a material portion of a copyrighted work is recreated, it is 
infringement.
60
 With this new rubric in mind, the court found the plaintiff had reproduced a 
material part of the Plaintiff’s book when they had sold copies with recreated maps inside. 61 
The holdings in cases such as Harrison, Doan, and Ginn, create a clear right to repair and 
restore copyrighted works in line with the First Sale doctrine, yet outside the language of the 
Copyright Act. However, this right is limited in scope. An underlying theme runs through all of 
these cases is that no duplication occurs. In both Harrison and Doan, the defendant was merely 
restoring, or repairing, the original copy. In Ginn, the court demonstrated the concern it had with 
duplication. The court indicated that the owner had the right to replicate parts of the copyright 
work to the extent that it was not material. In other words, an owner may make repairs, but not 
new copies. This theme is also present in the common law right to adapt or modify.  
2. The right to Adapt or Modify.  
On the same page as the common law right to repair and restore, are the rights to adapt 
and modify. These rights allowed owners of lawfully created copies to merge several 
copyrighted works together, and sell the works as a new collection. As with the rights to repair 
and restore, the right adapt and modify are limited to the extent that they do not create a new 
work benefiting entirely from the labor of the copyright holder.  
One of the first cases discussing the right to adapt or modify detailed how an owner, of 
several lawfully created copies, merged his collection with several non-propriety works, and sold 
that collection separately. In Kipling v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, the plaintiff sued a publisher who 
purchased numerous unbound copies of the plaintiff’s work, and bound them in an entirely new 
                                                        
59
 Ginn, 215 F. 772 at 779, citing, Harrison, 61 F. 689 at 689. 
60
 Ginn, 215 F. 772 at 778. 
61
 Id.  





 As part of the newly bound set, created by the defendant, were uncopyrighted works 
created by the same author, a biography written by another author, as well as an index.
63
 The 
Second Circuit held that the defendant, as the owner of copies of the plaintiff’s work, was 
entitled to create and distribute the new collection of the copies.
64
 
In Kipling, the redistribution of a copyrighted work falls neatly into the First Sale 
doctrine, but in addition there is the creation of an entirely new work, separate from the copy 
bought by the defendant. The holding in this case simply stood for the premise that nothing in the 
Copyright Act indicated that a person was forbidden from taking a lawfully owned copy, 
combined with another lawfully owned copy, and selling it as a new collection.  
Further illustrating the adapt or modify concept was the case of Fawcett Publications v. 
Elliot Pub. Co.
65
 In that case, both parties were members of the magazine publishing Industry.
66
 
The plaintiff had had obtained copyrights on several comics they owned.
67
 The defendant bought 
copies, bound them together, and resold them under the title double comics.
68
 The court held that 
the defendant did not infringe the plaintiff’s copyright.69 In coming to this conclusion, the court 
noted that the defendant had not multiplied copies, but simply resold the comics with a different 
cover.
70
 The plaintiff did not allege, and the defendant was not charged with, “copying, 
reprinting or rearranging” the material. With this in mind, the court determined that the plaintiff 
                                                        
62




 Id.  
65
 46 F. Supp. 717, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) adhered to on reargument sub nom. 17-65, 1942 WL 53407 (S.D.N.Y. July 
10, 2042) and adhered to on reargument sub nom. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Elliot Pub. Co., Inc., CIV. 17-65, 
1942 WL 77313 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1942). 
66
 Id.  
67
 Id. at 717-718, 
68
 Id. at 718.  
69
 Id.  
70
 Id. at 718. 
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could not make out a case of infringement.
71
 As such, Fawcett demonstrates that there is a 
common law right to adapt and modify lawfully obtained copies.  
This right to adapt or modify has limitations. That limitation is reached when an 
adaptation becomes a new creative work.
72
 This judicially created line balances the right of the 
copyright holder and the right of the public. On the one hand the public is entitled to take 
lawfully obtained copies, rearrange them, and resell them as a new collection. On the other hand, 
when the owner of the copyright does more than rearrange, and makes a new creative work, that 
is infringement.  
Tying together the common law property rights to repair, restore, adapt, and modify, the 
key element is that there is never duplication. From a policy prospective it makes sense to draw 
the line for exhaustion at duplication. Within the right to repair a lawfully purchased copy, 
common sense informs us that a person should be able to do what is necessary to enjoy their 
purchase. If a page of a book they enjoy is ripped out, they should be able to replace that page; 
otherwise it can no longer be enjoyed as it was intended. However, while it is reasonable that a 
person should be able to make repairs so they can enjoy their work, it is not reasonable to 
completely replicate a book. The same principal can be said with the right to adapt and modify. 
The owner of multiple lawfully created copies should be able to sell his collection as he sees fit, 
even if it means selling two copies bound together. On the other hand, to take apart these copies 
and rearrange them in a way that makes a new creative work, without the authority of the 
                                                        
71
 Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Pub., Co.46 F. Supp. 717, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) adhered to on reargument sub nom. 
17-65, 1942 WL 53407 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2042) and adhered to on reargument sub nom. Fawcett Publications, Inc. 
v. Elliot Pub. Co., Inc., CIV. 17-65, 1942 WL 77313 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1942). 
72
 See, Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant did not violate the plaintiff’s 
copyright when they mounted plaintiff’s work on ceramic tiles and resold the tile. As such the First Sale doctrine 
applied), but See. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
tiles were “derivative works” and infringed the copyrights, and the “first sale” doctrine did not apply to the 
preparation of derivative works).   
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copyright holder, goes far beyond the First Sale doctrine and common law property rights.  If this 
were allowed it would cheapen the incentive for copyright holders to make more creative works.  
This limitation on the right to repair, restore, adapt, and modify seems reasonable in a 
world where the copyrighted work is a physical item. However, when the very nature of the 
copyrighted work requires that it be transferred in its entirety, this limitation becomes an 
insurmountable obstacle. This is the problem with regard to digital media. As a result of this 
requirement, almost all of the rights, that are associated with physical copies, do not attach to 
digital copies. 
Part III. The proliferation of technology has withered away the First Sale doctrine 
 The First Sale doctrine, codified in the Copyright Act as section 109(a), provides for the 
exhaustion of copyrights after the first sale. This mechanism balances the rights of the copyright 
holder and the public, and also exists for digital media in section 117 of the Copyright Act. 
Despite this, exhaustion principles rarely apply to digital media. Part A. of this section will 
discuss the creation of copyright protections and limitations as applied to digital media. Part B. 
of this section will discuss how licenses, Digital Rights Management, and inflexible application 
of the Copyright Act to digital media has withered away any application of the First Sale 
doctrine, or the common law rights of property.  
A. Congress intended to extend the First Sale doctrine to digital media. 
 
 In theory, digital media shares many of the same protections as its tangible brethren. 
Digital media ranges from e-books, to mp3s, to videogames, to computer software, and it 
includes so much more. When Congress was first tasked to handle how the Copyright Act would 
address digital media, it did so with computer software. Where, Section 109 of the Copyright Act 
Tiscia   
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allows for the owner of a lawfully purchased copy to sell or otherwise dispose of their copy.
73
 
Section 117 of the copyright Act maintains the same for computer software.
74
  
 The current section 117 was drafted as part of the 1976 Copyright Act, and grew out of 
congressional concerns over the scope of copyright protection for computer programs. In 1976 
Congress simply was not equipped to answer the question of what the scope of protection would 
be for computer programs.
75
 To remedy that Congress enacted into the Copyright Act very 
broad, catch all, language so that creators of computer software would at least be protected until 
Congress could determine what copyright protection, if any, computer programs would receive. 
The original language of section 117 stated in pertinent part that: The title does not afford to the 
owner … any greater or lesser rights with respect to … automatic systems…, than those afforded 
to works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State.
76
 
The second action Congress took was to establish the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”).77 CONTU was made up of a panel of 
experts that studied the relationship between new technologies and copyright protection.
78
 The 
purpose of this organization was to make recommendations to Congress.
79
 In 1979 CONTU 
proposed four rights that would generate from ownership, or rightful possession, of a copy of 
computer software. First, CONTU suggested that copy owners be permitted to create Random 
Access Memory (RAM) copies.
80
 Second, because computer programs are subject to accidental 
                                                        
73
 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008). 
74
 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1998). 
75
 Sherwin Siy, Copies, Rights & Copyrights: Really Owning Your Digital Stuff, PKThinks, June 27, 2013, at 7, 
available at http://publicknowledge.org/blog/copies-rights-and-copyrights-really-owning-yo. 
76
 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 (1976). 
77




 Id.  
80
 NATIONAL COMMISSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 82 (1979). 
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deletion, CONTU suggested a right to create archival copies.
81
 Third, CONTU recommended 
granting copy owners the “right to make those changes necessary to enable the use for which it 
was both sold and purchased,” because operating software changed from device to device.82 Last, 
CONTU endorsed a right of distribution that extended not only to the original purchased copy 
but also to any exact copies made pursuant to the archival and essential-step privileges.
83
 
In 1980 Congress adopted the recommendations made by CONTU. The revisions to 
Section 117 were included in the Government Patent Policy Act of 1980.
84
 Congress enacted 
these recommendations with little to no discussion on the topic. This adoption of the 
recommendations by CONTU indicates that Congress intended for computer programs to receive 
the same sort of protection that physical copyrights receive. However, these rights are rarely ever 
enforced, primarily because the Copyright Act applies to the owners of legally obtained copies, 
and rarely does the person in possession of digital media own their copy.  
B. Despite a clear mandate from Congress, the rights created by CONTU are rarely applied 
to the possessors of copyrighted digital media.  
 
Despite a clear mandate by Congress to fully extend the principals of exhaustion to 
computer programs, crafty tactics by copyright holders, and case law favoring those tactics, have 
left each one of the recommendations by CONTU obsolete. End Users License Agreements 
(EULA) have made it so possessors of lawfully created copies own licenses, not the actual 
product. Since CONTU made their recommendations in terms of ownership, the provisions in 
regard to necessary creation of RAM copies, and archival copies, are by and large worthless.
85
 
The proliferation of Digital Rights Management has made it so it is illegal for anyone to 
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circumvent protections, placed by the copyright holder, on the software. This type of software, if 
not circumvented, makes it so a type of digital media can only be used in a certain way, and 
effectively destroyed any right to modify a program to work with different hardware. Last, the 
recent decision in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., held that by their very nature, digital 




First, Part 1. of this section will discuss the proliferation of licensing agreements and how 
they exist inside the framework of the decision in Bobbs-Merill. Then, Part 2. of this section will 
cover the creation of Digital Rights Management and how it prevents users of digital media form 
being able to enjoy their copies on different devices. Last, Part 3. of this section will discuss how 
the recent holding in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., has made it impossible to alienate 
digital media without violation copyright law.  
1. Bobbs-Merrill left the door open for sophisticated licensing agreements to circumvent 
Copyright Law  
 
EULAs have become a powerful tool for the owners of digital media to circumvent the 
First Sale doctrine. EULAs are essentially contracts. Typical language from a EULA states: 
“This software is licensed to you, not sold.”87 What does this language mean? Language like this 
means that the user of a lawfully obtained copy, despite engaging in a hand-to-hand transaction, 
is not the owner of their copy. This individual is simply the owner of a license; the copyright 
holder retains ownership of the digital media.
88
 The Supreme Court, in Bobbs-Merrill, 
specifically stated that they decided the case on Copyright grounds.
89
 That is to say, if the two 
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Over a century after the holding in Bobbs-Merill, the owners of copyrighted work would 
start to draft sophisticated licensing agreements, that conformed to the holding of Bobbs-Merill, 
yet effectively circumvented the principals of exhaustion in copyright law. One case in particular 
was Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.
91
 in that case the plaintiff purchased the defendant’s software at a 
garage sale.
92
 The defendant manufactured design software used by architects, engineers, and 
manufacturers, and offered its software to customers pursuant to an accompanying Service-level 
Agreement (“SLA”), which customers were required to accept before installing the software.93 
The licensing agreement provided that Autodesk retained title to all copies, and the customer had 
a nonexclusive, non-transferable, license to use it. 
94
 The plaintiff purchased a used copy of 
Autodesk's software at a garage sale, and sold it on eBay.
95
 Autodesk filed a number of 
takedown notices with eBay related to the plaintiff’s eBay listing.96 The plaintiff then brought 
suit seeking a declaratory judgment to establish that he was a lawful owner of the software.
97
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff was not an owner of the software, and was not 
entitled to sell copies on eBay.
98
 In doing so the court articulated a three-factor test for 
distinguishing between a software licensee and an owner of a copy.
99
 Applying the test to 
Autodesk's SLA, the court held that Autodesk's customer, from whom the plaintiff acquired the 
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used copies, was a licensee, and did not own the copies.
100
 Accordingly, neither the original 
customer, who bought the program, nor the plaintiff, could sell, or resell, their copies.
101
 
The holding of this case, on its face appears to conflict with the holding in Bobbs-Merrill. 
In Bobbs-Merrill, the defendant was found not to have contracted with the plaintiff.
102
 Vernor 
held that the first sale doctrine did not apply.
103
 Autodesk had never actually sold the software to 
the original customer. As such, the original licensee could never sell the software to the plaintiff. 
This case demonstrates how Bobbs-Merrill held open the possibility for copyright owners to 
draft sophisticates contracts to avoid exhaustion of their right to distribute.  In Bobbs-Merrill the 
plaintiff’s agreement provision, within the pages of the book, were not sophisticated enough to 
bind subsequent purchasers. However Vernor demonstrated a contract with language that 
prevented the original purchaser from owning the copy. As such, that purchaser could never sell 
the copy, nor could any of the subsequent purchasers.  
 EULAs have become widely accepted by most courts. As such the rights created by 
CONTU, to create RAM copies, and archival copies, of a computer program do not necessarily 
extend to license holders. The recommendations had language crafted for owners of lawfully 
created copies, not license holders. This conflicts with the common law rights of property, to be 
able to enjoy a copyrighted work as it was intended. Further, while these rights to make RAM 
copies, and archival copies are usually included in EULAs,
104
 there is no uniformity amongst 
EULAs from product to product, or company to company, and as such the owner of a licensed 
digital media may never know when he is violating copyright law.
105
 While licensing agreements 
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have called into question the rights granted by CONTU in relation to creating necessary copies, 
the right to make necessary changes to enjoy digital media on different operating software has 
been destroyed by Digital Right Management. 
2. Digital Rights Management makes it impossible to modify software to work on different 
devices 
 
The Common law property rights connected with exhaustion and the First Sale doctrine 
are also limited, if not blocked completely, by Digital Rights Management (“DRM”). DRM is 
software that restricts access and copying of copyrighted works.
106
 While DRM is not intended 
to interfere with First Sale principles, when applied practically it has the same effect.
107
 When 
viewing DRM in the light of the rights created by CONTU, the effect is to preclude the 
alienation of digital media from device to device. More concerning, however, is that case law 
does not treat different type of digital media in the same fashion when it comes to DRM. 
The case law indicates that taking music from a CD and transferring it to a device, such 
as an iPad is permissible, while doing the same with a movie on a DVD is not. In Recording 
Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., The plaintiff, recording industry, 
attempted to enjoin the manufacture and distribution, by the defendant, of the Rio portable music 
player.
108
 The Rio was a small device that allows a user to download MP3 audio files from a 
computer and to listen to them elsewhere.
109
 The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the Rio did 
not meet the requirements under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.
110
 The court 
determined that, the Rio was not a digital audio recording device subject to the restrictions of the 
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, and as such permitted the dissemination of MP3 audio files 
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from a CD to the Rio media player. 
111
 While this case stood for the premise that digital media on 
CDs could be moved from one device to another, the same concept does not hold true for DVDs.  
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the plaintiff, Motion picture studios, brought 
action under Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) to enjoin the defendant from posting 
software that decrypted movies on DVDs, and from including hyperlinks that made the 
decryption software available.
112
 The heart of the lawsuit revolved around the anti-trafficking 
provision of the DMCA.
113
 The technology, that the plaintiff alleged violated the DMCA, was a 
program called DeCSS.
114
 DeCSS decrypted the DVD's protection, and allowed users to copy the 
DVD's files onto the user's hard drive.
115
  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was tasked largely with First Amendment Speech 
questions in this case. However, the court also rendered an opinion on copyright defense 
grounds.
116
 The court determined that there was no fair use in replicating the encrypted files in 
their entirety in near perfect format.
117
 As such the court affirmed the decision of the lower court 




These two cases demonstrate, not only that there is a divide on the way certain types of 
digital media are treated, but also that in certain circumstances, an individual is not allowed to 
disseminate his digital media from one device to another. In the case of the person who owns a 
DVD, if they want to move the software from their computer onto their iPad, or other tablet 
device, that right is prevented by DRM. While the same person who buys a music CD , can take 
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the songs off of that CD, and place them on their iPad with little to no worries of violating 
copyright law.  
The holding in Universal City Studios, Inc., demonstrates that the right to modify 
software in order to enjoy the digital media on different devices has been eliminated for certain 
types of digital media. Furthermore, the concepts in the First Sale doctrine, and the common law 
right to the alienation of property do not attach to these types of media. When a person buys a 
book, they can fold the pages, highlight certain text, or cutout certain pages entirely. The owner 
of the digital copy of that book may have to seek permission to functionality, such as flipping 
pages on a tablet, or highlighting text in the e-book, or moving the e-book from a Kindle to an 
iPad.
119
 These requirements fly in the face of alienation of property principles. While these 
concerns, in regard to the modification of digital media are disturbing, recent case law has held 
that the alienation of digital media in its entirety is impermissible.  
3. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., held that there can be no alienation of digital media, 
because the transfer requires duplication.   
 
Despite CONTU’s recommendation, and the subsequent approval by Congress, to include 
a right to redistribute digital software in Section 117, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 
stands for the premise that there can be no digital media aftermarket.
120
 ReDigi marketed itself as 
“the world's first and only online marketplace for digital used music.”121 ReDigi invited users to 
buy, and sell, used digital media at cheaper prices than on iTunes.
122
 Users would upload files to 
ReDigi’s cloud storage, and the file would, in theory, be removed from the user’s computer.123 
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Upon sale to a customer, the file would be transferred to the customer’s computer, and the file 
from the cloud would be deleted.
124
 
The plaintiff claimed that the uploading constituted an unauthorized reproduction and 
distribution in violation of its copyrights.
125
 The plaintiff argued that the First Sale doctrine did 
not apply, because a different file was being copied and distributed.
126
 The court stated that the 
unauthorized duplication of digital music files over the Internet infringes a copyright owner's 
exclusive right to reproduce.
127
 However, whether the unauthorized transfer of a digital music 
file over the Internet, where only one file exists before and after the transfer, constitutes 
reproduction, was an issue of first impression. 
128
 
The court followed the plain text of the Copyright Act, which states a reproduction 
occurs “when a copyrighted work is fixed in a new material object.”129 Given the plain meaning, 
the court found that it was impossible to have the same “material object” transfer over the 
Internet. The Court held that ReDigi infringed Capitol's reproduction rights under any 
description.
130
 For this reason, the court held that the First Sale doctrine did not apply.
131
 
The holding in this case follows the plain language of the statute, and in doing so points 
out the fundamental flaw within section 117 of the Copyright Act. That fundamental flaw is that 
the concern of the court in the days of Bobbs-Merrill, Doan, Harrison, and the like all focused 
on duplication. The hallmark to a copyright infringement case was that replication or duplication 
takes place. However, there is no scenario where digital media can be transferred and not be 
copied or replicated. This holding, while staying true to the Copyright Act, eviscerates the 
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common law rights associated with property. The right to modify and repair was based on the 
premise that an individual ought to be granted some rights, normally allotted to the copyright 
holder, in order to enjoy the copy in the manner it was intended. While the previous cases 
dealing with physical property allowed for minor replications or duplications, the same logic that 
a minimal amount of copying can take place cannot be tethered to digital media.  
 Despite having section 117 of the Copyright Act state that digital media can be 
redistributed, under the plain meaning of the Act, and the holding in ReDigi, these copies can 
never be transferred or redistributed. This could potentially have devastating effects going 
forward. Businesses like Google, Amazon, Apple, etc. are all moving towards digital media only 
with no hard copies. Any of these companies who would utilize a cloud-based system are on 
notice that every single copyrighted item transferred to their cloud would cause them to be 
infringers. 
Part IV. The conflict between the public and Copyright holders, and their potential solutions 
 As evidenced by the above sections, there is a clear disparity in the way copyrighted 
physical and digital works are treated. However, simply suggesting that the two should be treated 
the same, or similarly, is not the answer. While the public would love to alienate their digital 
media, to do so might adversely affect the copyright holders to the point where they no longer 
have an incentive to create digital media. The concerns of copyright holders amount to the fact 
that there really is no such thing as second-hand digital media, and larger economic problems 
such as piracy. While these are pressing concerns, there are solutions to this problem that would 
allow the public to alienate their copies without fear of infringing copyright and at same time 
creating incentives for copyright holders.  
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 Part A. of this section will discuss the controversy between the public and copyright 
holders. Part B. of this section will discuss possible solutions to the problem, including the 
addition of all forms of digital media into the Copyright Act, making uniform EULA’s, and 
allowing for the alienation of licenses, as opposed to the alienation of ownership. 
A. Copyright holders demand more rights, which limit the alienation of the public, because 
the nature of digital media makes it incredibly easy to copy, and distribute, without the 
permission of the copyright holder 
 
The controversy that surrounds the application of common law property rights of 
alienation of digital media, stem from the fact that it only requires a single click on a mouse pad 
to illegally copy and distribute copyrighted work. To start with, copyright holders originally 
utilized licensing agreements during the time period when it was uncertain that computer 
software was going to receive copyright protection.
132
 As such, licensing agreements were 
created for the creators of computer programs to have any rights at all.
133
 After it became certain 
that digital media would be entitled to copyright protection, EULAs were utilized because of the 
ease with which digital media could be distributed without permission. 
The ease of copying is a result of the advancements within the entertainment industry. 
Advancements in technology have made the ability to make perfect copies of copyrighted work a 
reality.
134
 Prior to the 1990’s motion picture studios had made movies available for viewing at 
home in “analog” format. Movies in this format were placed on videotapes, which could be 
played on a videocassette recorder (“VCR”). 135  With analog movies, every time a copy is 
created, the quality deteriorates.
136
 As such, after several copies the quality was poor enough as 
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to make the copied movie less of an attraction to pirates.
137
 This same theory is readily 
applicable to music.
138
 Audiocassettes suffered from the same problems of deterioration as 
videocassettes.
139
 These problems of deterioration evaporated with the advent of digital media.  
Around the 1990s movie industries began to utilize DVDs. The benefit to DVDs was that 
they could store a substantially higher amount of information, and they could store much higher 
quality videos.
140
 The problem with DVDs was that the information on them was easily 
accessible to pirates.
141
 In order to evade this problem, the Movie industry went at lengths to 
secure protection for the media on these disks ,and to create encryption for them.
142
 Congress 
shared this concern, and in 1998 enacted the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA. Congress 
enacted this provision with the vision of stopping piracy before the work was even copied.
143
 The 
real intent behind the entertainment industry lobbying for this Act, and Congress approving these 
measure for limitation on copyrighted work, is that there is no such thing as second hand digital 
media.  
Given the advancements in the entertainment industry, it is fair to say that there is no 
such thing as secondhand digital media. This is because when a digital version of a copyrighted 
work is duplicated, there is no deterioration in the quality. As such, the existence of a 
secondhand market, such as the one described in ReDigi, presents a significant harm to copyright 
holders. In other words, under a scheme like the one in ReDigi, a secondhand market sells, what 
is essentially, the same exact product as the original. The secondhand market could sell the 
“used” media at a fraction of the price of the original. This would remove any incentive the 
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copyright holder had to create digital works. While the incentives of copyright holders are 
important, they must be balanced against the intent of the copyright act, which is to provide 
creative works to the public. 
It is clear that the 1976 copyright act intended to include the same alienation rights, under 
the first sale doctrine, that exists for physical copyrighted works, to digital media. As already 
indicated, those rights exist mostly in name only. Given the monumental concern voiced by both 
Congress, and the entertainment industry, it is easy to see why those rights have been dampened. 
However, allowing such a broad extension of rights, avoiding exhaustion principles seems 
irreconcilable with the purpose of the Copyright Act.
144
 It should be remembered that the 
monopolies granted to copyright holders are limited in nature, and while creative work should be 
encouraged and rewarded, the incentives to create must ultimately serve the cause of promoting 
the broad public availability of various arts.
145
 Further, technology has advanced to the point that 
it has created an ambiguity in the Act, and the Act should be interpreted in a light that benefits 
society as a whole.
146
 There is an ambiguity present in the Act, because the 1976 Copyright Act 
intended for alienation rights to be extended to digital media. However, to just simply construe 
the Copyright Act in favor of the public would do a large disservice to the entertainment 
industry. As such, there are several possible solutions to the problem. 
B. Solutions 
 There are a couple possible solutions to remedy the absence of any alienation rights, 
including the First Sale doctrine, in digital media. Part 1. Discusses the inclusion of all types of 
digital media within the ambit of the Copyright Act. Part 2. Discusses the creation of uniform 
EULAs, and Part 3. Discusses the alienation of access rights, as opposed to ownership rights. All 
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three of these solutions would return some rights that are associated with the common law rights 
of property to the act, while continuing to incentivize copyright holders to create digital works.  
1. The inclusion of all forms of digital media within the copyright act 
Include all forms of digital media into the copyright act, as opposed to just computer 
programs is the first possible solution. As discussed earlier, when Congress address the issue of 
how digital media would be dealt with, in the Copyright Act, it did so with computer 
programs.
147
  The world of digital media extends far beyond computer programs, and includes 
MP3s, e-books, digital movies, and so much more. However, the lack of uniformity within the 
copyright act has allowed for the creation of inconsistent opinions. As discussed earlier, with 
regard to DRM, CDs and DVDs are treated differently when their contents are alienated to 
different devices.
148
 Making of this tiny alteration to the copyright act would allow for the 
alienation of digital media by the public, while at the same time allowing for conduct that the 
entertainment industry already wishes to happen for its products. 
2. Making EULAs uniform to include users and not just owners  
The prevalence of EULAs has become troublesome for software owners, because many 
consumers end up agreeing to several, non-uniform, agreements before sitting down and opening 
their digital media. Take a computer program for instance. If a person buys a computer program 
from a retail store, they agree that they cannot return the product once it has been opened.
149
 
After that, once they put the disk into their computer they are greeted with an EULA which states 
you may not use this program without agreeing to this License Agreement. The EULA states that 
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the user of this software has been licensed this software they do not own it. The problem now is 
that if they disagree with the license they cannot return it back to the retail store, because they 
opened the package. If they agree to the license and want to sell it in the future that option is 
foreclosed as well. Since every software creator uses there own EULA there is no uniformity 
among the contracts. 
 If Congress were to mandate that EULAs be changed from user to owner, it would 
immediately end any fear that an innocent user could be sued for Copyright infringement. 
Further, making EULA’s uniform would ensure that the purchaser of a copyrighted product is 
not accidentally infringing one EULA while abiding by another. This solution would benefit the 
public by allowing a contracting system more in line with the common sense principals of 
property law, and not the complex algorithm that EULA’s have become. Additionally, this would 
still incentivize the creators of the copyrighted work by reducing the cost of litigation, by not 
having to worry about innocent infringers.  
3. Allowing for the transfer of licensees, as opposed to the transfer of ownership 
The last solution would require that copyright owners allow for users to transfer licenses 
of digital media, or Congress mandate that the owners of lawfully purchased copies be allowed 
to transfer licenses. The decision in ReDigi essentially held that there could be no transfer of 
digital media whatsoever. The current law gives an incentive to copyright holders that they were 
never intended to have. Copyright holders control the market, and there are no alternatives for 
buyers to go to. There are no second hand markets, and it allows for Copyright holders to charge 
unreasonable prices. Copyright law makes it difficult for the public to access creative works, and 
cuts against the original reason why the Copyright Act was created in the first place.  By 
transferring licenses, users would not have to worry about making copies. If a license was 
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transferred, theoretically the new owner of the license could re-download the work, while the 
owner of the media could delete it from the original users computer. This scenario would 
effectively manage rights, without turning innocent parties into infringers.  
Part V: Conclusion  
 The Copyright Act was intended to balance the rights of copyright holders and the public. 
Copyright holders were only to receive an incentive so that they would continue to make creative 
works. When copyrighted work existed in a primarily tangible format, the current Act was able 
to strike that balance. The laws of property, and copyright exhaustion, allowed users to freely 
dispose of their work as thy pleased. However, in a digital age Copyright creators have 
legitimate fears that their work will be infringed without their permission. In trying to protect the 
rights of Copyright holders, alienation principles are no longer applied for digital works. This 
conclusion is unrealistic given that a digital version of a copyrighted work should not be treated 
differently than the physical counterpart. In order to remedy these problems, solutions such as 
including all digital media within the copyright act, making EULAs uniform, and allowing for 
the alienation of access can be easily enacted. These solutions would return some of the rights 
associated with the alienation of personal property to digital media, while still allowing an 
incentive for copyright holders to create digital media.  
 
